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BRINGING FAIRNESS TO EXTRADITION HEARINGS:
PROPOSING A REVISED EVIDENTIARY BAR
FOR POLITICAL DISSIDENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
"Physical death I do not fear; death of conscience is the real
death."'
The right to self-determination is the common language, the
common voice, the common struggle of all revolutionaries. It is a
motivation that speaks to truth, justice, and ultimately peace. Yet,
shrouded by fear, the voices of revolutionaries are being suppressed.2
For security, simplicity, and clarity, we label those who stand against
repressive regimes as terrorists, without distinction, without
contemplation. Fearful of being a haven to alleged terrorists, the
United States is sending those who seek refuge from repressive
regimes back to their torturers.3 The willingness to embrace voices of
1. CYNTHIA MAHMOOD, A SEA OF ORANGE: WRITINGS ON THE SIKHS AND
INDIA 23-24 (2001) (quoting Jamail Singh Bhindranwale who led the movement for
Sikh civil and human rights and vociferously protested the second class status of
Sikhs and other minorities in India).
2. See generally John Patrick Groarke, Revolutionaries Beware: The Erosion of
the Political Offense Exception Under the 1986 United States-United Kingdom Sup-
plementary Extradition Treaty, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1515 (1988) (arguing that the
United States amended its extradition treaties with other Western countries in order
to facilitate the extradition of alleged terrorists); see also Susie Alegre, European
Arrest Warrants: A Lapse in Justice, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Feb. 2, 2004, avail-
able at http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/02/02/edalegre-ed3-php (noting that im-
mediately after September 11, 2001, the European Arrest Warrant emerged which
did away with "messy extradition procedures" among EU countries).
3. See generally Cheema v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding
that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) board did not provide enough
evidence pointing to Cheema as a security risk). After being in detention for a dec-
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dissent has dissipated, and safeguards that were once in place for
political dissidents, in the arena of extradition and asylum law, are
quickly being eroded.4
This Comment focuses on the story of Kulvir (or Kulbir) Singh
"Barapind" and examines how inequitable extradition procedures,
especially those relating to the political offense exception, undermine
due process for the relator.5 Barapind's story echoes the story of other
folk heroes.6  To Sikhs, Barapind is a human rights activist,
advocating for a separate nation, Khalistan; to the Indian government,
he is a terrorist.7 For the Indian government, his identity is not
defined by his sacrifice in challenging oppression amidst torture but
by the Indian government's desire to suppress the will of the Sikhs.
8
In India, from 1984 to 1995, to advocate for self-determination or
human rights was to seal one's death warrant. 9 Whether one was a
ade, Mr. Cheema decided to waive his Convention Against Torture (CAT) applica-
tion because the government had appealed the favorable Ninth Circuit opinion.
Camille T. Taiara, Harpal Singh Cheema Chose "Voluntary" Deportation, THE
SIKH TIMES, Aug. 7, 2006, available at https://www.sikhtimes.com/
news_080706a.html. It is a government tactic to prolong the granting of asylum to
suspected militants and keep them indefinitely detained until they voluntarily waive
CAT and go back to the countries which tortured them. Id.
4. See, e.g., Groarke, supra note 2, at 1515-16 (explaining how the redefinition
of the political offense exception within the new Supplementary Treaty between the
United States and the United Kingdom no longer allows magistrates to decide
whether crimes are of a political nature); Alegre, supra note 2.
5. Within this context, the term "relator" describes the individual whom the re-
questing country seeks to be extradited. For the purposes of this Comment, the
terms "relator" and "defendant" are used interchangeably.
6. Najeeb Hasan, The 1 1-Year Debate: For a Decade an Indian National Has
Been Held in California Jails. He's Accused of Being a Terrorist. Is He?, METRO
ACTIVE, Oct. 13, 2004, available at http://www.metroactive.com/papers/metro
/10.1 3.04/barapind-0442.html.
7. See Special Correspondent, Punjab Terrorist Brought from U.S., THE
HINDu, June 20, 2006, http://www.hindu.com/2006/06/20/stories/2006062
006461200.htm ("Kulbir Singh Kulbeera alias Barapind of the Khalistan Commando
Force was brought to India by a Punjab police team on Sunday night from the
United States following his extradition ordered by the competent American court.").
8. Brad Adams, Dead End in Punjab, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, December 17,
2004, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/12/17/india9909.htm ("To de-
stroy the movement [for Khalistan], security forces were given a free hand, leading
to the worst kinds of abuse.").
9. Id. For example, Jaswant Singh Khalra was abducted and killed after he ex-
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nonviolent protestor or a freedom fighter, the threat of
"disappearance" was constant.' °  It was during this period that
Barapind became an advocate for a separate homeland for Sikhs.''
After being tortured by the Indian government, 12 Barapind fled for
his life under an alias and sought asylum in the United States. 3 From
the beginning, Barapind's asylum case was complicated by the initial
adverse credibility finding of the Immigration Judge (IJ) in 1994.14
Eventually, the Ninth Circuit rejected the IJ's determination and
"faulted the IJ for treating, as established facts, India's criminal
allegations made against Barapind in the extradition request.' 15 That
extradition request was filed by India in 1997.16 After Barapind
appealed for a continuation of the asylum proceeding, the Ninth
Circuit held that asylum and extradition were exclusive proceedings
and directed that the asylum proceedings be held in abeyance pending
the outcome of the extradition hearing. 17 The Ninth Circuit en banc,
posed illegal cremations of unidentified corpses by the Punjab police. Press Re-
lease, Ensaaf, Anniversary of the Abduction of Jaswant Singh Khalra (Sept. 6,
2007), http://www.ensaaf.org/news/pr2007-09-06.php.
10. Press Release, Ensaaf, Punjab Police: Fabricating Terrorism through Illegal
Detention and Torture (June 2005 to Aug. 2005) at 7 (Oct. 5, 2005), available at
http://www.ensaaf.org/docs/ft-report.php.
11. Hasan, supra note 6.
12. In re Extradition of Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d 982, 987 (E.D. Cal. 2001), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, remanded to sub nom. Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744
(9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (using the district court opinion to flesh out background,
history, and facts that were accepted by the Ninth Circuit), remanded to Barapind v.
Amador, No. 1:01-CV-06215 OWW, (E.D. Cal. 2005) and In re Extradition of
Singh, No. 01-6215 OWW, 98-5489 OWW (E.D. Cal. 2005).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 985. An adverse credibility finding is when an Immigration Judge
(IJ) does not find the individual seeking asylum to be credible. See Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 § 208(b)(2)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(iii) (West
2007). The IJ may consider, for example, that there are numerous inconsistencies or
a lack of detail and specificity in the applicant's story. Id.
15. Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 985 (affirming the district court's decision to re-
mand for further proceedings).
16. Id. at 986.
17. Id.
3
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in Barapind v. Enomoto, gave the final decision to extradite Barapind
in 2005.18
Through the lens of Barapind, this Comment analyzes and
challenges both the presumption of fairness accorded to the requesting
state and the extreme evidentiary burdens placed on the defendant.
The scope of the Comment is limited only to cases where the political
offense exception is at issue in extradition hearings. Part II
summarizes the background of extradition law focusing on the
political offense exception, the rule of non-inquiry,' 9 and the rule of
non-contradiction. 20 Part III describes the Indian government's past
and present use of coercive and abusive investigatory techniques. Part
IV argues that, although courts are bound by the rule of non-inquiry,
the rule should not bar the court from scrutinizing a foreign
government's investigatory techniques for gathering evidence to form
probable cause. Then, Part V proposes that a Franks hearing, 21 a
hearing in which a defendant can challenge the veracity of the
government's evidence, should replace the vague, overbroad rule of
non-contradiction. Finally, Part VI concludes that removing the
presumption of fairness given to foreign governments and relaxing the
evidentiary burden on the defendant is in accordance with
international human rights norms. Part VI also warns that in ignoring
18. Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 753 (9th Cir. 2005).
19. The rule of non-inquiry precludes courts from scrutinizing foreign govern-
ments' judicial systems and the procedures or treatment that await defendants in
their countries of origin. Comejo-Barreto v. Seifert [sic], 218 F.3d 1004, 1009 n.5
(9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler v. United
States, 721 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1983); Gallina, 278 F.2d at 79.
20. Jacques Semmelman, The Rule of Non-Contradiction In International Ex-
tradition Proceedings: A Proposed Approach to the Admission of Exculpatory Evi-
dence, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1295, 1297 (2000) (coining the phrase "The Rule of
Non-Contradiction" to define the rule that defendants in extradition cases cannot
merely contradict the requesting country's evidence; they must obliterate it).
21. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) ("[W]here the defen-
dant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in
the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding
of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the de-
fendant's request.").
4
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these safeguards, the United States leaves itself vulnerable to
imputation of violations committed by the requesting country.22
II. BACKGROUND: EXTRADITION
Historically, the United States has been cautious of entering into
extradition agreements because of its mistrust for monarchial regimes
and the widely-held belief that America is a refuge for those seeking
asylum.23 Thomas Jefferson disfavored extradition and recognized
that the value of liberty was at stake in extradition proceedings. 24 The
first extradition agreement appeared in 1842, and Congress followed
in 1848 by enacting the first statue authorizing international
extradition. 25 Today, extradition law is governed by treaty,26
27statutes, and case law. In the absence of any law requiring the
contrary, the policy of the United States is to deny extradition to the
requesting foreign government.28 Because an extradition hearing is
not a criminal matter, both the Executive and Judicial Branches
engage in a delicate balance between the rights of the relator2 9 and
foreign policy implications.3'
22. John Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry and the Impact of Human Rights on
Extradition Law, 15 N.C. J. INT'L L. &CoM. REG. 401, 415-17 (1990).
23. Abraham Abramovsky, The Political Offense Exception and the Extradi-
tion Process: The Enhancement of the Role of the U.S. Judiciary, 13 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 1, 8 (1989).
24. See Andrew J. Parmenter, Death by Non-Inquiry: The Ninth Circuit Per-
mits the Extradition of a U.S. Citizen Facing the Death Penalty for a Non-Violent
Drug Offense [Prasoprat v. Benov, 421 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2005)], 45 WASHBURN
L.J. 657, 661 (2006).
25. Id. at 662.
26. See, e.g., Treaty for the Mutual Extradition of Criminals Between the
United States of America and Great Britain, U.S.- Gr. Brit., Dec. 22, 1931, 47 Stat.
2122 (made applicable to India in 1942 under art. 14) [hereinafter Extradition
Treaty].
27. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3195 (1996).
28. Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 9 (1936) (no ex-
ecutive discretion to extradite the relator unless authorized by statute or treaty).
29. Rachel A. Van Cleave, The Role of United States Federal Courts in Extra-
dition Matters: The Rule of Non-Inquiry, Preventative Detention, and Comparative
5
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Procedurally, a foreign government must first make a request to
the U.S. State Department for extradition. 31 The treaty, which governs
extradition procedures, sets parameters regarding the extent of
documentation (evidence) needed to issue a warrant for the
defendant's arrest.32 Evidence of probable cause to charge the
defendant with a specified crime is what leads to an issuance of a
warrant.33 The defendant is then presented before a magistrate
judge. 34 During the hearing, the magistrate must first evaluate the
foreign government's probable cause evidence to determine whether
to extradite.3 5  Additionally, the magistrate considers terms of the
treaty that may bar extradition. 36  One such provision in most
extradition treaties is the political offense exception doctrine.3 7 If the
court finds the relator extraditable, the court then considers additional
arguments as to why the extradition should be denied.3 8  If the
magistrate finally agrees with the foreign government's contention,
the magistrate must certify the extradition to the U.S. Secretary of
State.39
The Executive Branch possesses the primary authority in
extradition cases because of foreign policy implications.4 °  This
authority is vested within the Secretary of State who has ultimate
Legal Analysis, 13 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 27, 38 (1988).
30. Id. at 40.
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 478 cmt. a (1987).
32. Id. § 478 reporters' note 1 (1987).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at cmt. d.
36. See id.
37. See infra Part II.A.
38. Van Cleave, supra note 29, at 37 (explaining that the scope of the rule of
non-inquiry begins at this stage of the extradition process). The reason the rule of
non-inquiry begins in the second phase is because that phase involves non-
justiciable issues. See Lis Wiehl, Extradition Law at the Crossroads: The Trend
Toward Extending Greater Constitutional Procedural Protections to Fugitives
Fighting Extradition from the United States, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 729, 772 (1998).
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 478(2)(b) (1987).
40. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 478 cmt. a
(1987).
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discretion on the extraditability of the defendant.4' Even if the
magistrate certifies extradition, the Secretary of State can deny
extradition.4 2 A magistrate's decision cannot be appealed; it is only
reviewable by a federal district judge through a writ of habeas
corpus.4 3 In evaluating any extradition hearing, the judge must be
mindful of three major doctrines: (1) the political offense exception,
(2) the rule of non-inquiry, and (3) the rule of non-contradiction. 4
A. Political Offense Exception
In 1843, the political offense exception45 was first applied to a
treaty between the United States and France.4 6  The historical
justification behind applying the exception to extradition treaties was
threefold. First, political dissent may be a means to affect change.47
Second, unsuccessful rebels could possibly face unfair procedure or
punishment in their country of origin due to their anti-government
actions or opinions.4 8 Third, non-political branches of governments
"should not intervene in the internal political struggles of other
nations" by working to turn over political dissidents. 49
Today, the scope of the political offense exception is being
narrowed by the threat of global terrorism. 50 The distinction between
41. Id. § 478(3).
42. Id.
43. Id. at cmt. c.
44. See infra Parts II.A-C.
45. Hereinafter, "political offense exception" will is used interchangeably with
"exception" or "exception doctrine."
46. Parmenter, supra note 24, at 665.
47. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Note,
American Courts and Modern Terrorism: The Politics of Extradition, 13 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. &POL. 617, 622 (1981)).
48. Id. (citing M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 425 (1974); C. VAN DEN WINJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENSE
EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION 3 (1980); Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Po-
litical Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226, 1238
(1962)).
49. See id.
50. Groarke, supra note 2, at 1527-31.
7
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domestic uprisings and international terrorism is being blurred.5'
Generally, international terrorism falls outside the scope of the
political offense exception in extradition treaties; political uprisings
within the requesting nation's boundaries have generally triggered the
exception. 52 Many, feeling that the United States will become a haven
for terrorists, have called for the eradication of the political offense
exception doctrine altogether.53 However, the exception doctrine is so
fundamental to our notions of self-determination that it should not be
hastily discarded for fear of harboring "terrorists. 54
Recently, the Ninth Circuit ruled on Harpal Singh Cheema's
asylum application applying asylum law's political offense exception,
analogous to that of extradition law.55 The court argued that "[o]ne
country's terrorist can often be another country's freedom-fighter."
56
The court further explained that revolutionaries embraced by the
United States who opposed repressive European powers, anti-
Communists governments, and Apartheid (e.g., Nelson Mandela)
would all be labeled terrorists today. 57 Furthermore, the court noted
that, throughout the twentieth century, actions of revolutionaries
abroad have had few consequences which directly affect persons or
property in the United States.58 The court concluded that any strain on
foreign relations is "offset by the reputation earned by the United
States as a continuing cradle for liberty in other parts of the world.,
59
The political offense exception has been shaped both judicially
and by treaty. To fall under the exception, the defendant must satisfy
51. See Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 750 (9th Cir. 2005); see also
David M. Lieberman, Sorting the Revolutionary from the Terrorist: The Delicate
Application of the "Political Offense" Exception in U.S. Extradition Cases, 59
STAN. L. REV. 181, 189-90 (2006).
52. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 807.
53. See, e.g., Joan Fitzpatrick, Rendition and Transfer in the War Against Ter-
rorism: Guantanamo and Beyond, 25 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 457, 474
(2003); Miriam E. Sapiro, Extradition in an Era of Terrorism: The Need to Abolish
the Political Offense Exception, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 654 (1986).
54. Quinn, 783 F.2dat793 n.ll.
55. Cheema v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2004).
56. Id. at 858.
57. See id. at 859.
58. Id. at 858.
59. Id.
8
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a two-prong analysis. 60 First, the magistrate must determine whether a
substantially violent uprising has arisen in the requesting country. 61
Civil wars are generally sufficient to meet the test of a violent
uprising, as determined in Barapind.62 On the other hand, the
exception is narrowly tailored and many acts of violence will not fall
under the exception.63 Second, the magistrate determines whether the
defendant's acts were in furtherance of or "incidental" to those
uprisings. 64  The ultimate determination on whether the defendant
meets the "incidence test" is made by the judiciary not the Secretary
of State.65 Additionally, political motivation by itself does not trigger
the exception. 66 Each treaty sets parameters for what constitutes a
political offense.67 The treaty between India and the United States, for
example, stipulates that attacks on heads of state and their families fall
outside the scope of the exception. 68 Aircraft hijacking or sabotage,
attacks upon or hostage-taking of dignitaries, and drug related
offenses are also beyond the exception. 69
The two-pronged framework is designed to balance the rights of
political revolutionaries against the need to punish those who seek to
instill fear by indiscriminately killing civilians.70 Even when the
political offense exception applies, however, extradition treaties give
60. Barapind, 400 F.3d at 750.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 756-57.
63. See id. at 750 (quoting Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 797 (9th Cir.
1986)).
64. Id.
65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 478 reporters' note
3 (1987) (citing Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 513-17 (7th Cir. 1981)); United
States v. Mackin, 668 F.2d at 132-37 (2d Cir. 1981).
66. In re Extradition of Lahoria, 932 F. Supp. 802, 819 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
67. See, e.g., Parmenter, supra note 24, at 665.
68. Extradition Treaty, supra note 26, arts. 3, 6.
69. Id.
70. See Matthew S. Podell, Removing Blinders from the Judiciary: In re Artt,
Brennan, Kirby as an Evolutionary Step in the United States-United Kingdom Ex-
tradition Scheme, 23 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 263, 263 (Spring 2000) ("[O]n the
one hand lies a desire to ensure that perpetrators of violence are duly punished for
their unlawful acts; on the other is the historical notion that the United States should
protect those who are unjustly persecuted in their native lands.").
9
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foreign nations a presumption of fairness with respect to the evidence
they put forth. 71 The State will often certify the request for a warrant
by the requesting nation based on whether the offense charged is in
the treaty itself.72 In Gallina v. Fraser,73 however, the court alluded to
the possibility of challenging the presumption of fairness when
criminal procedures or punishments of foreign governments offend the
dignity of the judicial process. 74  Although no court has directly
challenged the presumption of fairness that requesting nations receive
at the onset of the extradition hearing, political offense exception
cases provide a favorable context in which to rebut this presumption.
Some scholars even argue that the political offense exception
circumvents the rule of non-inquiry. 75 If so, this would give the courts
the discretion to deny the presumption of fairness given to a
requesting nation in certain limited circumstances.
B. Rule of Non-Inquiry
No law mandates that a foreign judicial proceeding or criminal
sentencing conform to the notions of due process that the U.S. court
system affords defendants. In fact, the rule of non-inquiry prevents
habeas courts76 from scrutinizing the "judicial process" of the
requesting nation as well as the treatment that awaits a defendant.77
The basis of the rule of non-inquiry was first enunciated in Neely v.
Henkel.78  The Court in Neely held that American citizens who
71. Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911).
72. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3184 (West 2007).
73. Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960).
74. Id. at 79.
75. Parmenter, supra note 24, at 665 (citing Abramovsky, supra note 23, at 9).
76. Sandhu v. Burke, No. 97 Civ. 4608(JGK) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2000) (citing
Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1066-67 (2d Cir. 1990); Gill v. Imundi, 747 F.
Supp. 1028, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("The rule of non-inquiry, which prohibits the
extradition court from considering such matters, applies with at least as great force
to the habeas court.")).
77. Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert [sic], 218 F.3d 1004, 1009 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000),
aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Cornejo-Barreto v. Siefert, 379 F.3d 1075 (2004),
reh'g en banc granted 386 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated as moot 389 F.3d 1307
(9th Cir. 2004); Ambjornsdottir-Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d 679, 683 (9th
Cir. 1983); Gallina, 278 F.2d at 79.
78. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122-23 (1901).
10
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 38, No. 1 [2007], Art. 12
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol38/iss1/12
2007] BRINGING FAIRNESS TO EXTRADITION HEARINGS 187
commit a crime in a foreign nation and flee from justice cannot then
complain "if required to submit to such modes of trial and to such
punishment as the laws of that country may prescribe for its own
people . . ... 79 The rule of non-inquiry relies on the principle
foundation that the Executive Branch, not the courts, is best situated to
look at a foreign government's judicial system and to make
determinations that could implicate foreign policy. 80 However, in the
decisions that have addressed the matter, there is no mention that the
criminal procedure of the requesting nation cannot be challenged at
the onset of the hearing, as implied in Gallina.
81
An exception to the rule arguably occurs when the "procedures or
punishment [are] so antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency
as to require reexamination of the principle [rule of non-
inquiry].... 82 This is commonly regarded as the humanitarian
exception.83 This exception has never been applied to any extradition
case because of international comity,84 executive discretion, 85 and
strict observance of the treaty provisions. 86 More importantly, the
79. Id. at 123.
80. See Michael P. Scharf, Foreign Courts on Trial: Why U.S. Courts Should
Avoid Applying the Inquiry Provision of the Supplementary U.S.-U.K Extradition
Treaty, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 257, 269 (1988) (observing that "the State Department
is in a superior position to consider the consequences of a non-extradition decision
upon foreign relations than the courts" because that department "has diplomatic
tools, not available to the judiciary, which it can use to insure that the requesting
state provides a fair trial").
81. See Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960) (indicating that the
rule of non-inquiry is not absolute and that it will not be followed where the likely
treatment in the requesting state is "antipathetic to a federal court's sense of de-
cency").
82. Id.
83. Emami v. U.S. D. Ct. for N.D. of Cal., 834 F.2d 1444, 1452-53 (9th Cir.
1987).
84. Quigley, supra note 22, at 415.
85. Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Wacker v. Bis-
son, 348 F.2d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 1965)).
86. Mainero v. Gregg, 164 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding "no basis
for invoking any exception to the 'rule of non-inquiry' that constrains courts in this
country from examining the penal systems of the nation requesting extradition in the
extradition hearing"), superseded by statute, Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructur-
ing Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, as recognized in Comejo-
Barreto v. Seifert [sic], 218 F.3d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 2000).
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humanitarian exception's impact has been limited because it squarely
challenges the rule of non-inquiry. Traditionally, the rule of non-
inquiry is implicated during the second phase of the extradition
hearing, 87 which begins after the court has determined the
extraditability of the relator and shifts to examine reasons why
extradition should be denied.88 Traditionally, it is at this juncture that
the rule of non-inquiry is implicated.89 Yet, courts have failed to
apply an exception to the rule of non-inquiry even when questions are
raised about the requesting nation's policies and procedures. 90 During
the evidence phase, therefore, courts must inquire into the procedures
of a foreign nation before certification of extradition in order to
circumvent the rule of non-inquiry.
C. Rule of Non-Contradiction
The rule of non-contradiction refers to a defendant's limited right
to contest the foreign government's evidence during an extradition
hearing. 9  This evidentiary standard precludes a defendant from
introducing evidence that merely contradicts the foreign government's
evidence. A defendant is only allowed to introduce evidence that
"obliterates" or "explain[s] away the requesting government's
evidence of probable cause. ,92 Not only is the evidentiary threshold
extremely high, but it is also vague and confusing as to what evidence
"obliterates" or "explains away" the government's evidence. 93 In fact,
all that is known is that there must be "clear-cut proof' in order to
destroy the government's evidence. 94
87. Van Cleave, supra note 29, at 42.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Hoxha v. Levi, 465 F.3d 554, 564 n.14 (3d Cir. 2006).
91. Semmelman, supra note 20, at 1304.
92. Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 2005).
93. In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ('The distinction
between 'contradictory evidence' and 'explanatory evidence' is difficult to articu-
late."); David M. Rogers, International Law: Extradition and The Political Offense
Exception, 26 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 479, 484 (2004) (describing the term
"obliterate" as a tenuous definition); In re Extradition of Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d
982; Semmelman, supra note 20, at 1304.
94. Semmelman, supra note 20, at 1304.
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For example, in Barapind v. Enomoto, the Indian government
produced unsigned and undated affidavits, together with unsigned
photographs, 95 to implicate the defendant in all eleven charges. 96
Each of the witness' affidavits purportedly identified the defendant as
the attacker or accomplice in the homicides and attempted
homicides.97 To undercut the government's evidence, the defendant
obtained signed affidavits, containing recantations, from those same
witnesses.98  The defense believed these recantation affidavits
obliterated and explained away the Indian government's evidence.
99
The court, however, found that recantations could not be determined
as credible without a trial. 100 Because extradition courts do not weigh
contradictory evidence in probable cause determinations, the court
found no basis to overturn the government's evidence. 101
Although some courts have argued that magistrates have
discretion in admitting contradictory evidence, 10 2 most courts have
rarely exercised this discretion, leaving the defendants with the
Herculean task of obliterating the government's evidence. 10 3  The
extreme evidentiary burden for the defendant arises because the
95. The photographs presented were unsigned even though there was a place
for putting one's signature and the date on the photograph. See Petitioner Kulvir
Singh Barapind's Principal Brief at 29-30, Barapind v. Enomoto, No. 02-16944 (9th
Cir. Apr. 9, 2003) [hereinafter Barapind's Principal Brief]. Also, witnesses were not




98. Barapind, 400 F.3d at 749-53.
99. Barapind's Principal Brief, supra note 95, at 48-49 ("When the govern-
ment's only evidence is obliterated by recantations, the government fails to establish
probable cause.") (citing In re Contreras, 800 F. Supp. 1462, 1465 (S.C. Tex.
1992)).
100. Barapind, 400 F.3d at 749-50.
101. Id. at 750.
102. See, e.g., In re Gonzales, 52 F. Supp. 2d 725, 738 (W.D. La. 1999); Ma-
guna-Celaya v. Haro, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 1998); In re Contreras,
800 F. Supp. 1462, 1464 (S.D. Tex. 1992); Republic of France v. Moghadam, 617 F.
Supp. 777, 781 (N.D. Cal. 1985). In Maguna-Celaya v. Haro, the Eleventh Circuit
subsequently reversed and ruled in favor of the government, the process undermined
the rule of non-contradiction. Semmelman, supra note 20, at 1323.
103. See, e.g., Barapind, 400 F.3d at 750.
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extradition proceeding is not a trial on the merits.1°4 For the same
reason, in an extradition hearing, the foreign government is not
expected to provide all its witnesses and evidence.' 05 Nonetheless, the
difficult distinction between contradictory and explanatory evidence
blurs the boundaries regarding the rebuttal evidence the defendant
must produce. 10 6 Hence, a new rule that presents a clear standard
while giving the defendant a meaningful opportunity to counter the
foreign government's evidence is essential.'0 7 Given the interplay
between the exception doctrine, the rule of non-inquiry, and the rule
of non-contradiction, the defendant's plight becomes even more
burdensome when he opposes a foreign nation whose abusive
practices are masked by a presumption of fairness, making an
alternative rule essential.
III. THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT'S SANCTION OF ABUSES
BY THE PUNJAB POLICE
The pogroms of Sikhs in 1984 ignited violent and nonviolent Sikh
"movements" for a separate homeland. 108 After engaging in counter-
insurgency efforts for over a decade, from 1984 to 1995, the Punjab
104. See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-67 (1970) (discussing
differences between administrative hearings and trials in the context of terminating
welfare benefits). "We recognize the importance of not imposing upon the States or
the Federal Government in this developing field of law any procedural requirements
beyond those demanded by rudimentary due process." Id. at 267.
105. See id.
106. See Semmelman, supra note 20, at 1298-99 (discussing how courts have
not clearly distinguished between contradictory and explanatory evidence).
107. See infra Part V.
108. JASKARAN KAUR, ENSAAF, TWENTY YEARS OF IMPUNITY: THE
NOVEMBER 1984 POGROMS ON SIKHS IN INDIA 102-18 (2d ed. 2004), available at
http://ensaaf.org/complete- 1984report-v2.pdf.
In the November 1984 massacre of Sikhs, the organizers of the carnage
were not primarily driven by an intent to drive Sikhs out to other territo-
ries, such as to Punjab. Instead, their actions, such as the use of kerosene
and burning alive as the main method of murder, and their expressions all
spoke of their intent to destroy Sikhs as a group.
Id. at 118. Barbara Crossette, India's Sikhs: Waiting for Justice, 21 WORLD POL'Y
J., 70, 70 (Summer 2004), available at http://www.worldpolicy.org/joumal/articles/
wpj04-2/Crossette.html ("About 3,000 Sikhs [the number is still in dispute] were
murdered in nothing less than a pogrom, most of them in Delhi.").
14
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police gained a reputation for being specialists in anti-terrorism. Yet,
even a cursory inspection of the atrocities committed in the name of
anti-terrorism reveals why the Punjab police eventually quelled the
insurgency. The police systematically engaged in torture,
extrajudicial killings, fake encounters, and disappearances. 10 9 The
police mercilessly attacked militants and civilian men, women, and
children." °  Maintaining the Sikh identity or having a real or
perceived affiliation with militants instantly put civilians in jeopardy
of liquidation or police harassment."' Punjab's evolution into a
police state led to forced confessions under duress, torture, and often
violence against the victim's families if they pursued any form of
redress.1 2 The impunity enjoyed by the Punjab police, acting under
the authority of the Indian government, allowed for continuous human
rights violations such as illegal detentions and torture that continued
even after the militancy was crushed." 13
A. The Indian Government Presents a Good Example of Why a
Foreign Government's Evidence Must Not Be Accorded a
Presumption of Fairness
Beginning in November 1984, the Indian government deliberately
suppressed, tampered, and destroyed evidence implicating high-
ranking government officials in orchestrating genocide against
Sikhs. 114  In order to insulate the government officials directly
involved, inaction gripped the police, the government, and the
administrative agencies.' 15 Judge Dhingra, a Delhi judge, in a 1996
opinion, concluded, "[u]nless the system rewrites itself and the
investigating agencies are liberated from the clutches of the executive,





114. See RAM NARAYAN KUMAR, REDUCED TO ASHES: THE INSURGENCY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN PUNJAB 45 (2003), available at http://www.ensaaf.org/docs
/reducedtoashes.php. Judge Dhingra accused police of these abuses in a ninety-two-
page opinion and held the government responsible for sheltering the agents involved
in the genocide. Id.
115. Id.
15
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there is little possibility of faithful and honest investigation."'"
6
During the decade-long insurgency, police officials in Punjab
systematically violated their criminal procedures by exacting
confessions under duress and through the destruction and fabrication
of evidence. 117
The unlawful investigatory techniques used by the police still
continue today." 8 Since the practice of impunity remains unchecked,
the police have never had to reconcile their abusive law enforcement
practices. One torture survivor recounts how the police arrested him
and forced him to drink water from the same bowl he used for
excrement. 119  Furthermore, they attempted to scare him into
"put[ting] [his] thumbprint on some papers."' 120 These coerced
signatures or thumbprints are generally placed on blank arresting
documents so that the police can write the victims' confessions to
implicate the victims themselves or a suspected militant.' 2 ' For
example, one case that gained international acclaim was that of
Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar, who was sentenced to death by the Indian
Supreme Court. 122  Amnesty International and other human rights
116. Id. at45.
117. See id. at 172.
118. See generally Ensaaf, supra note 10, at 7.
119. Jaskaran Kaur, Comment, A Judicial Blackout: Judicial Impunity for Dis-
appearances in Punjab, India, 15 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 269, 279 (2002).
120. Kaur, supra note 119, at 279; Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 1019 n.9 ("In half
of the recantations, the witnesses state they were forced to sign or to place their
thumbprint on the blank sheets of paper.").
121. See, e.g., ENSAAF, PROTECTING THE KILLERS: A POLICE OF IMPUNITY IN
PUNJAB, INDIA 90 (Oct. 2007), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2007/indialO07/.
("According to Pritam Kaur, three officers, names withheld, at gunpoint forced Pri-
tam Kaur and her granddaughter, who had accompanied her, to place their thumb-
prints on the FIR [First Information Report]."). A son who witnessed the Punjab Po-
lice kill his father filed a complaint the following day, and the police made him sign
a blank piece of paper, which was later used to fabricate his father's cause of death.
Amnesty International, India: Break the Cycle of Impunity and Torture in Punjab
(Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index
/engasa200022003.
122. Robert Matas, Grant Clemency to Sikh Man, Canada Urges India,
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organizations joined in urging clemency because Mr. Bhullar's
confession was written by the police after he had signed a blank piece
of paper. 23 He was forced to sign the blank paper because the police
threatened to kill him in a fake encounter.' 24 Every Sikh living
through the counter-insurgency period was gripped with fear because
people in every village and town knew relatives or friends who had
been killed in fake encounters. 125
Another major case was the disappearance of Jaswant Singh
Khalra. Khalra was a human rights lawyer who exposed cremation
grounds in numerous districts in Punjab. 126 These cremation grounds
functioned to obscure any evidence of those whom the government
took, tortured, or killed in fake encounters. 127 Eventually, in 1995,
after his investigation prompted threats to his life, Khalra
disappeared. 128 Recently, six Punjab police officials were convicted
for their roles in the 1995 abduction and murder of Khalra. 129 The
Punjab police spared no one; even an Indian Justice was arrested
because he called for nonviolent self-determination. 130  He further
"castigated the police policy of suppressio veri, fabrication of
evidence, and elimination and torture of 'terrorist' suspects."131
Sadly, these policies did not disappear like the militancy in the
mid-1990s. In 2005, the same unlawful tactics emerged when bombs
exploded in two movie theaters. 32 Over a span of three months,
numerous Sikhs were detained. 33 Documentation by the human
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See ENSAAF, supra note 10, at 20.
126. Press Release, Punjab Cops Convicted of 1995 Murder of Activist Khalra,





130. P.M. Varadarajan, Letter: Jailed for Speaking Out in India, INDEPENDENT
(London), June 24, 1992, at 20.
131. Id.
132. Blasts Hit New Delhi Cinema, ABC NEWS ONLINE, May 23, 2005,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200505/s 1374317.htm.
133. See, e.g., Hari Kumar, Top Sikh Militant Held in Cinema Blasts, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 2005, at A16.
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rights group Ensaaf shows that police systematically fabricated
evidence to justify the criminality of suspected militants. 134  The
Ensaaf investigation revealed that there were contradictions between
informants and the police regarding the place of arrest, which
undermined the allegations of the crimes.' 35 Moreover, the police
harassed family members when they could not extract confessions by
torturing the alleged suspects.' 36 Informants also described family
members who were tortured to elicit pressure on "the targeted
individual."137 After his release from jail, Kashmir Singh, a bus driver
who claims he was tortured by Punjab police, showed signs of having
received a physical beating and was unable to walk.' 38 Undoubtedly,
the police were able to extract Kashmir Singh's signature.' 39
These abusive police techniques in gathering evidence have
persisted since 1984. Barapind's case and others must be viewed in
context to fully appreciate the lack of impartiality that any foreign
government would have when seeking extradition of a suspected
militant.
B. Test Case: Barapind v. Enomoto
1. Background
Barapind's struggle to restore the dignity of Sikhs manifested in
his leadership position with the All India Sikh Student Federation
("Federation"),140 a nonviolent political organization.141 At the age of
twenty-four, Barapind learned directly about the police excesses he
had spent years advocating against. 142 Shortly after he organized a
134. ENSAAF, supra note 10, at 4, 7 (Amnesty International reported that "Jus-
tice R.L. Anand, a member of the Punjab State Human Rights Commission [re-
ported] that more than 80 percent of the complaints filed against the Commission
were against Punjab policemen."). Id. at n.20.
135. Id. at 16.
136. Id. at 18.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 18-19.
139. Id. at 19.
140. Barapind's Principal Brief, supra note 95, at 1.
141. See Hasan, supra note 6.
142. Id.
18
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protest, Barapind was arrested. 143  At the police station, he was
stripped down and hoisted into the air with his hands tied behind his
back. 144  As his shoulders contorted backwards he was struck
repeatedly in the midsection. 45 Unsatisfied with Barapind's answers,
the torture continued:
Barapind was made to sit on the floor and extend his legs, his hands
still tied behind his back. An officer rode a three-foot-long wooden
roller... back and forth over Barapind's thighs a few dozen times.
His shrieks of pain did nothing to stop the process. Next, officers
grabbed each of Barapind's ankles and began pulling his legs in
opposite directions until he felt as if the muscles in his groin would
rip.
14 6
After fainting from the pain, he was revived, and the process
continued . . . for eight days. 147  Eventually, the charges against
Barapind were dismissed. 48  However, the next summer he was
arrested again for allegedly sheltering militants.1 49  This time the
police attached wires to his toes, fingers, and genitals to electrocute
him. 5 0 He later described that he felt as if the skin on his penis was
peeling off.'51
In 1993, using false documents and a false identity, Barapind
reached Los Angeles International Airport.1 52 Upon arrival, the INS
detained Barapind, and Barapind immediately sought asylum.' 53
Subsequently, Barapind's asylum proceeding was interrupted and held










152. In re Extradition of Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d 982, 985 (E.D. Cal. 2001).
153. Id.
154. Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 2005).
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Instead of freedom, Barapind spent the next thirteen years
enduring the physical and psychological effects of indefinite detention
while prohibited from wearing his turban and, thus, being stripped of
his identity.15 5  After being imprisoned in a Bakersfield county
detention center during his prime years, Barapind was recently
extradited back to his torturers in Punjab.156  This completed the
evolution of a youthful activist struggling for self-determination into
an alleged terrorist imprisoned by those who initiated him to India's
form of justice. Now, almost forty-years-old and having spent the last
thirteen years imprisoned, there is legitimate concern that he will be
tortured, killed, or unjustly convicted in India. 157
Human Rights Watch recently submitted a letter detailing the
history of mistreatment Sikh activists have faced at the hands of the
Indian government. 158 They urged the government to ensure that the
police not torture or mistreat Barapind. 159 It is easy to lose sight of the
fact that Barapind, until this day, has never accepted the Indian
government's accusation that he was part of the Khalistan Commando
Force.! 60 He continues to advocate for nonviolent resistance. 61
2. Procedural History
Barapind was charged with murder, attempted murder, and
robbery on eleven different counts.1 62  The magistrate at the
155. Kept in a Fresno County jail, Barapind was unable to wear his Turban.
Hasan, supra note 6. The Turban for a Sikh encompasses his identity and not wear-
ing a Turban violates a fundamental Sikh tenant. REHAT MARYADA art. XVI, § t.
Similarly, Harpal Singh Cheema was only allowed to cover his head with a small
turban when he prayed. Complaint at 8-9, Cheema v. Thompson (E.D. Cal. 2006),
available at http://www.gurmat.info/sms/smspublications/sikhrehatmaryada.pdf.
There is nothing more degrading for Sikhs than to be stripped of their identity.
156. Human Rights Watch, India: Don't Torture Sikh Activist Extradited by
U.S.: Security Forces Routinely Abuse Sikhs in Custody, June 20, 2006,
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/06/20/india13584_txt.htm [hereinafter India: Don't
Torture].





162. Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 2005).
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extradition hearing certified Barapind for extradition on only three of
the eleven crimes.163 In response, Barapind petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus. 64 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of California denied the petition. 165 Barapind then appealed to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where a three-judge
panel affirmed the lower court's ruling.' 66 The Ninth Circuit found
that the three counts fell outside the political offense exception. 67
The Ninth Circuit granted a re-hearing en banc and affirmed the
district court's denial of habeas petition on two of the three counts. 168
The remaining count was remanded to the district court to determine
whether it fell within the political offense exception as defined in
Quinn v. Robinson.169
3. Eleven Criminal Counts
The extradition treaty created between the United States and Great
Britain was made applicable to India in 1942 while India was still
under British rule. 170 The court analyzed eight legal standards under
the 1931 Treaty.171 Barapind argued that the Indian government failed
to satisfy two of the standards. 172  First, the court found that the
evidence produced by the government was not sufficient to meet the
probable cause threshold for certain charges. 173 Second, it found that
all the criminal allegations met the political offense requirements. 174
Additionally, the court found that five counts fell under the





167. Id. at 752.
168. Id. at 753.
169. Id.; see also Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 783 (9th Cir. 1986).
170. Id. at 747 n.3 (discussing the Extradition Treaty, supra note 26).
171. In re Extradition of Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d 982, 992 (E.D. Cal. 2001),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded to sub nom. Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d
744 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1015-29.
174. Id. at 1030-38.
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extracted under torture, threats to life, and fabrication of evidence.'75
Dropping eight of the eleven charges should have compelled the court
to abandon the presumption of fairness it gave to the Indian
government's evidence. 7 6 The defense further contended that, even if
the remaining offenses fell outside the exception, the extradition was
politically motivated. 77 Although the court affirmed that each offense
must be looked at separately under the doctrine of specialty, 7 8 which
generally limits prosecution to non-political charges, the court
overlooked the obvious implication in this case, where the foreign
country sought prosecution specifically because of the political nature
of the offense.' 79
The Indian government's evidence was comprised solely of
testimony from unsworn eye-witnesses or police officials; where the
statements from witnesses were "uncertified translations in the
English language."' 180 No physical evidence linked Barapind to any of
the crimes.' 8' Even so, the U.S. government authenticated the
evidence as meeting probable cause. 182  The district court judge
acknowledged that India's identification evidence was subject to
"substantial question" and would probably not meet the U.S.
175. The Extradition of Kulvir Singh Barapind to India, ENSAAF,
http://www.ensaaf.org/docs/barapind.php (last visited Oct. 23, 2007).
176. Barapind's Principal Brief, supra note 95, at 1-4.
177. This can be countered by the rule of specialty. But does the rule of spe-
cialty work in political offense contexts?
178. Barapind, 400 F.3d at 749 (citing Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 783
(9th Cir. 1986)) ("The doctrine of 'specialty' prohibits the requesting nation from
prosecuting the extradited individual for any offense other than that for which the
surrendering state agreed to extradite.").
179. Contra id. at 755 ("It is within the sole discretion of the Secretary of State
to determine whether a country's extradition request is a subterfuge for punishing the
accused for a political crime.").
180. In re Extradition of Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1013 (E.D. Cal. 2001)
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded to sub nom. Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d
744 (9th Cir. 2005).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1013, 1015 (citing Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317 (1922)
("Unsworn statements of absent witnesses may be acted upon by the committing
magistrate.").
22
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 38, No. 1 [2007], Art. 12
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol38/iss1/12
2007] BRINGING FAIRNESS TO EXTRADITION HEARINGS 199
evidentiary burden of proof in criminal matters. 83 Nonetheless, the
judge found it sufficient to merit probable cause.' 84
The court, weighing Barapind's recantation evidence, believed
that it fell within the spectrum of obliterating to contradicting
evidence. 185 Moreover, "except for crimes in which the eye-witnesses
were employed by the Indian government or were opposed to the
Khalistan movement ... in all but one case, sworn recantations are
offered, affirmatively stating that the witness did not make the
purported identification of Barapind."' 86 The one case where there
was no recantation was a coerced confession by Tarlochan Singh-
implicating Barapind as his accomplice-who perished after being
cruelly tortured by the Indian police.187 Moreover, Barapind provided
expert opinion and affidavits certifying India's use of obtaining
confessions through torture and fabrication of evidence, demonstrating
that any evidence produced by the Indian government is unreliable.' 88
The judge noted that "the inquiry into the reliability of India's
evidence cannot be ignored."' 89 Though the district court found some
of the evidence unreliable because it was fabricated or obtained by
torture' 9° and found five counts eligible for the exception,' 9' the court
still affirmed three charges of murder and attempted murder. 192
4. Three Criminal Counts Remaining
The Ninth Circuit, en banc, looked specifically at these three
counts' 93 that the lower court determined fell outside the exception.' 94
183. Id. at 1015.
184. Id. at 1020, 1024-27.
185. Id. at 1018.
186. Id. at 1019.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 1019 n.9.
190. Id. at 1023, 1029.
191. Id. at 1033-35.
192. Id. at 1039.
193. FIR (First Information Report) 100, 89, 34. A FIR is a document pre-
pared by Indian police in response to an alleged crime. Human Rights Initiative, Po-
lice and You, http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/police/fir.pdf (last
visited Nov. 13, 2007).
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In the First Information Report (FIR) 100, Barapind was charged with
attempted murder and murder. 195  Allegedly, Barapind was an
accomplice in a scooter drive-by when he shot and killed one man and
injured another. 196 The evidence the government put forth was a
statement by Makhan Ram who was injured during the shootout. 197
The defense submitted a recantation signed affidavit, which stated that
Makhan Ram never identified Barapind. 198 On the contrary, Makhan
Ram claims that he was forced "to sign a blank sheet of paper which
they subsequently turned into affidavits identifying Barapind."' 199 As
stated before, this is a common practice by the Punjab police.200 The
court's determination, however, was that recantation evidence merely
raised a triable issue of fact and therefore the conflicting evidence did
not "obliterate" the government's evidence.201
It is important to note that there is a split of authority on the
admissibility of recantation evidence as a means to obliterate
government evidence.20 2 In Eain v. Wilkes,2 °3 the Seventh Circuit
excluded recantation evidence because it was a matter to be
considered at trial.20 4 In contrast, in In re Matter of Extradition of
Contreras,20 5 the court admitted recantation evidence, finding that it
met the probable cause requirement.20 6 Interestingly, there are a few
major distinctions between Contreras and Wilkes.
First, in Wilkes, the "extraditees complained that the translations
of the inculpating statements were inherently suspect, and that when
194. Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 2005).





200. See supra Part III.A.
201. Barapind, 400 F.3d at 749-50.
202. In re Extradition of Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d 982, 994, 1016-17 (E.D. Cal.
2001), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded to sub nom. Barapind v. Enomoto, 400
F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 2005).
203. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 511-12 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 894 (1981).
204. Id. at 504, 511-12.
205. In re Extradition of Contreras, 800 F. Supp. 1462, 1469 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
206. Id. at 1469.
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the statements were made, the extraditees mistakenly believed their
statements could not harm them. '20 7 On the contrary, in Contreras the
statements were coerced, some by torture, and were recanted at the
first opportunity in open court.2 °8 The court in Contreras found this
distinction significant and believed that its decision did not conflict
with the Seventh Circuit finding.2 °9
When comparing Contreras to Singh, the major difference is the
lack of in-person recantation in Singh.21 ° Interestingly, the district
court in Singh found that an "indicia of reliability" would have been
given to recantations if they had been made under oath and in court.
21
'
Yet, in-person recantation was not possible in Barapind's case because
the Indian government refused discovery requests in India and refused
to issue travel visas to Barapind's counsel to get the statements under
oath. 2 12
In FIR 89, Barapind was charged for his involvement in the
murders of four individuals. 21 3 Three of the murders were found to be
politically motivated but one of the murders, involving the wife of a
police collaborator, was found to be outside the exception. 214 The
court found it dispositive that Barapind had not answered the
questions of whether: (1) the wife was a police collaborator; (2)
whether Barapind intended to kill her because of her political beliefs;
or (3) whether it was an accident.21 5  One can only imagine the
difficulty in providing the specific motivation for a crime when there
has been no admission of participation in such a crime. Barapind can
207. Id.; see also Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 511.
208. Contreras, 800 F. Supp. at 1469.
209. Id.
210. Compare In re Extradition of Contreras, 800 F. Supp. at 1462 (statements
recanted in court), with In re Extradition of Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1018 (E.D.
Cal. 2001), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded to sub nom. Barapind v. Enomoto,
400 F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 2005) (statements recanted in affidavits and not in open
court).
211. In re Extradition of Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1018 (E.D. Cal. 2001),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded to sub nom. Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d
744 (9th Cir. 2005).
212. Id.
213. Barapind, 400 F.3d at 750.
214. Id. at 751-52.
215. Id.
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only challenge the exception and point to the widespread fabrication
of evidence produced by the Indian government.
In FIR 34, Barapind was charged for his role in the murder of four
men during a shootout between insurgents and an Indian government
officer, a former officer, and body guards.216 India produced an
affidavit as evidence alleging that police inspector, Nirmal Singh,
identified Barapind as one of the shooters. 21 7 In response, Barapind
produced a recantation affidavit from Nirmal Singh "stating that he
never identified Barapind or any other participant in the shootout.,
218
The court, however, found that FIR 34 suffered from the same
problems as FIR 100.219
Eventually, the court affirmed FIR 100 and FIR 89 but remanded
FIR 34 to determine the political affiliations of the victims and
whether the acts themselves fell within the exception. 22' Given the
level of manipulation, fabrication, and abuse apparent in Indian
criminal procedure, it is evident that exception cases present a critical
problem with respect to the impartiality of the requesting state.
Therefore, to safeguard fundamental due process the court must
abandon the presumption of fairness given to foreign governments in
exception cases.
IV. THE PRESUMPTION OF FAIRNESS GIVEN TO FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS' EVIDENCE IN POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION
CASES IS UNDULY PREJUDICIAL TO THE RELATOR
Extradition treaties typically invoke the notions of comity and
sovereignty. Once a foreign nation sends an extradition request, the
State Department certifies that the "requesting state may be relied
upon to treat the accused fairly., 221 In most extradition cases, the




219. Id. at 752-53.
220. Barapind, 400 F.3d at 753.
221. Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 415 (E.D. N.Y. 1989) (citing to S.
Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1988) (Secretary of State should
use its discretion to ensure that the extraditee will not be subject to torture)), afJd,
910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990).
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criminals abroad and return them for prosecution in the requesting
country. In these cases, the foreign government is merely facilitating
the process of redress for its nationals, acting almost as a neutral,
disinterested party or intermediary.
However, in the exception context, foreign governments are
seeking extradition for harm directly perpetrated against the
government. They are neither neutral nor disinterested in their
demand to have the relator extradited. Courts, recognizing the
political motivations of requesting nations, have suggested limitations
on the presumption of fairness given to requesting states if the
defendant can persuasively demonstrate that he would be unjustly
prosecuted or punished by the requesting nation.
222
Although a reasonable argument, it has not prevailed because of
the rule of non-inquiry, which bars courts from looking into the
judicial process of the requesting nation and any punishment a
defendant may receive upon his extradition. 223 As previously stated
though, the application of the rule of non-inquiry is limited to the
second phase of the extradition hearing. 224 Therefore, by analyzing
the magistrate's role in determining probable cause, it is possible to
show that the presumption of fairness can be attacked at the initial
stage of the extradition hearing because judicial determinations are
made at this stage and do not warrant the application of the rule of
non-inquiry. 225
222. Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 415; Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir.
1960) (recognizing that "the conditions under which a fugitive is to be surrendered
to a foreign country are to be determined solely by the non-judicial branches of the
Government," and that "[t]he right of international extradition is solely the creature
of treaty," but commenting in dicta that "[w]e can imagine situations where the rela-
tor, upon extradition, would be subject to procedures or punishment so antipathetic
to a federal court's sense of decency as to require reexamination of the principle set
out above.").
223. Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert [sic], 218 F.3d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 2000).
224. Supra Part II.B. (after certification of extradition is complete and the Sec-
retary of State makes the final determination on extraditability).
225. Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758, 765-66 (9th Cir. 1997), with-
drawn, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998).
203
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A. Magistrate's Role in Evidentiary Proceeding
An alien within the jurisdiction of the United States enjoys due
process protections under the Fifth Amendment even if his presence is
unlawful.2 26 An extradition hearing is not a "criminal prosecution, ,227
and therefore, the federal rules of criminal procedure and evidence do
not apply. 228 Within this context, the constitutional protections for the
relator are decreased, while the government reaps the benefit of a
lower threshold regarding the admissibility of evidence.229 Even
though the accused in an extradition hearing has due process rights,
courts do not require that the evidence presented to extradite be
sufficient to convict.230
The government must accomplish three objectives in a hearing:
(1) show that there is a valid treaty between the two nations, (2) prove
that the relator's conduct is a crime in both jurisdictions and does not
fall within the exception, and (3) provide evidence sufficient to
establish probable cause of the crime having been committed.23' Once
probable cause is deemed sufficient, the magistrate certifies the
extradition request and the Secretary of State makes the final
determination. 232
After a determination on extraditability, the magistrate is often
barred (by the rule of non-inquiry) from evaluating the judicial
process and punishment that awaits the relator.233 This task has been
delegated to the Executive Branch, specifically the Secretary of
State.234 The rationale for having the Executive Branch make the final
determination on extraditability is that the branch is better equipped to
make judgments about the conditions that await a relator in the foreign
country. 235
226. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976).
227. Desilva v. Dileonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 1999).
228. Martin v. Warden, 993 F.2d 824, 828 (11th Cir. 1993).
229. See Bovio v. United States, 989 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1993).
230. Peroff, 542 F.2d at 1249.
231. Gonzalez, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 736.
232. See Van Cleave, supra note 29, at 36-38.
233. Id. at 37.
234. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3186 (West 2007).
235. See Martin v. Warden, 993 F.2d 824, 829 (11 th Cir. 1993).
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B. How Courts Determine Probable Cause
The standard used to examine the foreign government's evidence
in an extradition proceeding is probable cause. 236 This is a common
standard used in federal preliminary hearings. 2 37  "Under this
standard, the government must show evidence sufficient to cause a
person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a
reasonable belief of the accused's guilt." 238 Any confessions made
under duress, even if authenticated, are "unreliable and would be
given little weight. 239
During the evidentiary proceeding, the magistrate looks at the
totality of circumstances when evaluating the foreign government's
evidence. 240  To comply with due process, each piece of evidence
submitted by the foreign government must be separately evaluated.24'
The magistrate must then discern whether the facts establish probable
cause for a crime under the specified treaty.242 Thus, probable cause
is a justiciable question to be determined by the magistrate.243
Therefore, the rule of non-inquiry cannot be invoked at this stage of
the proceeding since the magistrate "must make an independent
judicial determination whether a factual basis exists for believing that
the accused person committed an extraditable crime."244
236. Sindona v. Grant 619 F.2d 167, 175 (2d Cir. 1980).
237. Id.
238. See also Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979) (internal quotes omitted).
239. United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 121 (1st Cir. 1997).
240. United States v. Welch, 55 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that
courts must consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a state-
ment was voluntary).
241. Atuar v. United States, 156 Fed. Appx. 555, 563 (4th Cir. 2005) (unpub-
lished opinion); see Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. 511, 516-17 (1916) (requiring
"competent and adequate evidence" for probable cause).
242. Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 512 (1896).
243. See id.
244. Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758, 767 (9th Cir. 1997) withdrawn,
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C. Presumption of Fairness Not Protected by Rule of Non-Inquiry
Traditionally, courts have not scrutinized the investigatory
techniques of foreign governments because of the presumption of
fairness given to requesting nations and the rule of non-inquiry. Yet,
the rule of non-inquiry does not bar courts from looking at whether the
competency of evidence is undermined by abusive investigatory
methods.2 45  A warrant that possibly contravenes the Fourth
Amendment is a judicial determination 246 and it behooves the courts to
evaluate rather than to remain blind to the injustice.
Courts need not attack the rule of non-inquiry squarely; courts can
circumvent the rule by focusing on the first phase of the extradition
hearing, a phase in which the determination of extraditability still has
to be weighed. The rule of non-inquiry does not extend to this phase
of the hearing because the determination of extraditability is a
justiciable question, whereas questions about why extradition should
be denied once certified are arguably non-justiciable.247
For example, when the defense convincingly 248 demonstrates that
the foreign government procured evidence unlawfully, the
presumption of fairness given to foreign governments should be
stricken. To argue that courts should not evaluate the methods in
which foreign governments procure evidence lacks force because
courts consistently look abroad-in exception cases-to establish the
political nature of the offense.249 In Barapind, the court should have
given greater weight to its determination that the Indian government
fabricated evidence, tortured a witness to death, and displayed a
pattern of coercive investigatory procedures.250  Hence, the
justiciability of these issues preclude any reservations for
contravening the rule of non-inquiry, and therefore, courts should
have the discretion to look at the investigative process that
245. Id.
246. Id. (citing Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 790 (9th Cir. 1986)).
247. Id. at 765-66.
248. The preponderance standard is generally appropriate for civil cases.
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991).
249. Parmenter, supra note 24, at 674-75.
250. See In re Extradition of Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 1029; Petitioner's Prin-
cipal Brief, supra note 95, at 38-39.
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governments undertake to procure evidence. 25' This evaluation avoids
conflict with the rule of non-inquiry while allowing the defendant to
rebut the presumption of fairness that foreign governments receive.
The rule of non-inquiry is a forward-looking device that is applied
after the certification of extraditability is issued 2  However, one
court has applied the rule of non-inquiry prior to a finding of
extraditability. 253 The Assarson court held that it was beyond the
scope of judicial review to determine whether the relator was
"properly charged., 254  The key distinction, however, is that the
relator sought to extend the conditions of the treaty.255 Where the
treaty itself "conditions extradition on the existence," for example, of
probable cause, then that provision is reviewable by the courts and
falls outside the purview of the rule of non-inquiry.256 Nevertheless,
in Assarson, the treaty did not condition the extradition on the crime
being properly charged; hence, any inquiry would be barred not by the
rule of non-inquiry but by the treaty itself.257  Additionally, the
Second Circuit held that when "evidence indicated officially
sanctioned torture and abusive criminal proceedings, the presumption
of fairness accorded to a requesting nation might be abandoned.,
258
Consequently, since one of the conditions of the treaty between the
United States and India mandates that evidence meet the probable
cause threshold,259 which is an issue for judicial determination, any
251. See Parmenter, supra note 24, at 674-75.
252. Van Cleave, supra note 29, at 40-41.
253. See generally In re Assarsson, 635 F.2d 1237 (7th Cir. 1980) (refusing to
assess, out of respect for sovereignty, whether the foreign government complied
with its own criminal procedure).
254. Id. at 1244.
255. Id. at 1241.
256. Emami v. U.S. D. Court for N.D. of Cal., 834 F.2d 1444, 1448 (9th Cir.
1987).
257. Assarsson, 635 F.2d at 1242.
258. David B. Sullivan, Abandoning the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International
Extradition, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 111, 127 (citing Rosado v.
Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179, 1195 (2d Cir. 1980)). The Second Circuit has stated that
the due process clause in the Constitution may bar extradition under some circum-
stances. Id. at 127.
259. See Extradition Treaty, supra note 26, art. 9.
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application of the rule of non-inquiry would be an unauthorized
extension of the rule at this juncture. 260
Furthermore, courts and legal scholars have suggested that the
rule of non-inquiry be limited-especially in the context of the
political offense exception. 26' This is practical because courts have to
inquire into the policies of foreign governments to determine if the
crime meets the standard of a political offense. At this initial stage of
the hearing, the court is best situated to examine how the foreign
government procured its evidence. Proponents of this judicial model
argue that the protection of the individual requires judges to take an
active role and inquire into the conditions of the requesting country.
262
The rationale is based on the courts being an impartial arbitrator who
can fairly safeguard the relator's human rights. 263  Also, courts
provide a forum removed from diplomatic concerns that consume the
Executive Branch and therefore can more objectively ferret out the
truth.
When presented with convincing rebuttal evidence, courts should
determine the veracity of the evidence received rather than leaving it
to the Executive. The State Department's priority is to safeguard
foreign policy, and therefore, the courts are an "important check on
the executive's power to extradite." 264 The courts' review will ensure
that individual rights during an extradition request are protected
according to our constitutional ideals.
The Indian government is not the only government that continues
to fabricate evidence and use torture to exact confessions. 265 Using
260. Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758, 767 (9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn,
143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998).
261. See Ahmad v. Wigan, 726 F. Supp. 389, 415 (E.D. N.Y. 1989) ("The bur-
den of proof is on petitioner to come forward with a written submission showing a
substantial probability that he or she can rebut the presumption of State Department
propriety in assuming the fairness of the judicial process in the requesting coun-
try."); Michael P. Shea, Expanding Judicial Scrutiny of Human Rights in Extradition
Cases After Soering, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 85, 90-91 (1992).
262. Shea, supra note 261, at 91-92.
263. Id. at 92.
264. Van Cleave, supra note 29, at 40.
265. "Some police forces in Mexico still use torture to extract confessions from
suspects, but have developed new, more sophisticated ways of doing so that are
harder to detect." Associated Press, Mexican Human Rights Commission Investigat-
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India as a template, any presumption of fairness accorded to
requesting nations in the exception context should be vitiated.
Moreover, if the evidence is not enough to destroy the presumption of
fairness given to the requesting state, the evidence should at least be
used to corroborate the relator's defense in attempting to defeat the
probable cause determination.
V. PROPOSING A NEW EVIDENTIARY STANDARD THAT IS
CONSISTENT WITH DUE PROCESS
The rule of non-contradiction acts almost as an absolute bar to
challenging the veracity of a foreign government's evidence. Courts
have held that contradicting the government's evidence is not enough;
it must be "explained away" or "obliterated. '266 The rationale for
employing such a strict standard is that an extradition hearing is not a
trial on the merits. 267 The belief is that the accused will get a fair
chance to rebut the foreign government's evidence during a trial in the
foreign country. However, in the context of exception cases, the
requesting nation is not a neutral party; the standard to challenge the
government's evidence must be lowered to afford the relator an
opportunity to mount a meaningful, but limited, defense.
The rule of non-contradiction is not only vague but also poorly
defined.268 Courts have differed over the interpretation of the rule and
have even come to contradictory conclusions. 269 If the application of
the rule has no predictability and is vague so as to deter a proper
defense, it violates the relator's due process rights and is
unconstitutional. With these deficiencies, it is no surprise that the rule
has been eroded by case law.270
ing 12 Torture Complaints So Far in 2005, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE, Nov. 22,
2005, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/mexico/20051122-1406-
mexico-torture.html.
266. See In re Extradition of Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d 982, 994 (E.D. Cal. 2001),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded to sub nom.
267. See Semmelman, supra note 20, at 1298.
268. Id. at 1297-98 (describing the rule as "somewhat murky" and noting that
courts applying the Rule [of Non-Contradiction] have not clearly delineated between
explanatory and contradictory evidence).
269. Id. at 1311-13.
270. Id. at 1314.
209
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An alternative approach, which was first established in Franks v.
Delaware and known as a Franks hearing, 271 would restore a sense of
balance to the extradition hearing. Employing Franks hearings would
provide clarity to the evidentiary hearing while giving the defendant a
meaningful opportunity to contest the government's evidence.
Additionally, a Franks hearing will maintain the goals of an
extradition hearing by avoiding a trial on the merits. Even though
defendants in extradition hearings are not accorded the plethora of
constitutional rights given defendants in criminal proceedings, basic
due process rights still govern extradition hearings.27 2 A Franks
hearing would satisfy these due process requirements.
A. Franks Hearing
In Franks,273 the defendant challenged the affiant's description of
the youth officer's identification of the defendant.274 Allegedly, the
youth counselor identified the defendant's clothing, which
corroborated the victim's statements.275 The defendant subsequently
questioned the youth counselor who then recanted the statements
276
recorded on the affidavit. In adopting a hearing to determine the
veracity of the government's affidavit, the Supreme Court had to
contend with exactly the same concern as any extradition court: Does
a defendant have a right to challenge the truthfulness of factual
statements made in an affidavit supporting a warrant and used to
establish probable cause?27
7
271. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978).
272. Semmelman, supra note 20, at 1300.
273. It is important to note that Franks v. Delaware represents a criminal case,
yet, the rationale adopted by the Supreme Court logically extends to the extradition
arena because it is a limited hearing that provides the defense an opportunity to rebut
the presumption of fairness given to the affiant. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 169-70 (ex-
plaining the role of such a hearing in protecting Fourth Amendment rights). This
hearing safeguards fundamental constitutional rights. Id.
274. Franks, 438 U.S. at 156.
275. Id. at 157.
276. Id. at 157-60.
277. Id. at 155.
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Here, the Court addressed two considerations that would militate
against challenging the veracity of a warrant.278 First, probable cause
determinations do not adjudicate guilt or innocence. 279 Second, the
Warrant Clause "takes the affiant's good faith as its premise. 28°
Similarly, extradition courts are deterred from considering evidence
that is more properly considered in a trial setting. 281 Moreover, an
extradition treaty gives a presumption of fairness to the evidence
provided by the foreign government. 282 However, the court in Franks
found powerful mitigating reasons for allowing the defendant to
challenge the veracity of the warrant. 283  First, "a flat ban on
impeachment of veracity could denude the probable cause requirement
of all real meaning. ' '284 Second, this complete ban could lead to
intentional falsification of affidavits if there is no adequate check.285
Third, ex parte proceedings, where the government and magistrate
validate affidavits without the presence of the defendant, are less
vigorous than an adversarial proceeding. 286 Finally, the Court held as
follows:
Where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that
a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless
disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant
affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the
finding of probable cause, the Fourth amendment requires that a
hearing be held at the defendant's request. In the event that at the
hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established
by the defendant by preponderance of the evidence, and, with the
affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining
278. Id. at 160-65.
279. Id. at 160-61.
280. Id. at 164.
281. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 476 cmt. b (2007).
282. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 478 cmt. b
(2007) ("Depositions, warrants, and other papers are admissible in extradition hear-
ings in the United States if they would be admissible for similar purposes in the re-
questing state, and if they are properly authenticated.").
283. See generally Franks, 438 U.S. at 168-71.
284. Id. at 168.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 169.
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content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search
warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the
same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the
affidavit. 28
7
The Court, fully realizing the presumption of validity given to
search warrants, mandated more than a conclusory attack or a desire to
cross-examine to achieve an evidentiary hearing. 288 The defendant
has the burden of specifying direct allegations of falsehood or reckless
disregard for the truth. 289 These are strict standards, yet they afford
the defendant a meaningful opportunity to mount a defense without
having a trial on the merits. Moreover, a request for a Franks hearing
in an extradition court would allow the defendant to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the evidence in the affidavit is
false.290
Additionally, the Franks Court provided guidelines on what proof
a defendant should proffer. First, the defendant should specifically
point out what portion of the affidavit is false.29 1  Second, the
accusation should be supported by affidavits, sworn statements, or
other reliable statements of witnesses.292 Third, any allegations of
negligence or good faith mistakes would be insufficient. 293  And
finally, setting aside the false portion of the affidavit, the remaining
content can be relied upon for determining probable cause.29 4
Therefore, the defendant must attack the heart of the affidavit to be
successful.
By applying a Franks hearing to Barapind, the court, instead of
focusing on the contradictory evidence provided by the defense, 295
would look for a substantial preliminary showing that false evidence
287. Id. at 155-56 (emphasis added).
288. Id. at 171.
289. Id.
290. See id. at 155.
291. Id. at 171.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 171-72.
295. Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 750 (9th Cir. 2005).
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was knowingly or recklessly included by the affiant.296 In Singh, the
court found that some of the affidavits were fabricated and that one
witness was killed by torture while being forced to identify
Barapind.297 Therefore, Barapind would meet the first prong of the
Franks hearing by making a substantial preliminary showing. 298 Next,
a hearing would be granted, and the defendant would have to show
that the government provided false evidence by a preponderance of
the evidence. 299 Here, the majority of Barapind's defense rested on
recantation evidence, which underscores the argument that the
government fabricated affidavits. Using the current framework, the
rule of non-contradiction, the Barapind court found that recantation
evidence did not "obliterate" the government's evidence because a
trial was needed to make this determination. 300
However, by implementing a Franks hearing, the magistrate
would not be forced to make difficult, and sometimes arbitrary,
decisions as to what evidence obliterates, negates, or simply
contradicts the government's evidence. The magistrate's sole concern
would be whether the defendant can show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the government's evidence is false or obtained by a
reckless disregard for the truth.
Barapind's defense provided substantial recantation evidence and
corroborating documentation of the Indian government's abusive
investigatory polices. 30 ' The court had already dismissed three counts
296. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56.
297. See Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 1029 ("It is probably more true than not true
that Tarlochan was tortured [and] that his identification of Barapind was involuntar-
ily obtained."). A credibility determination can be made to show evidence procured
by the torture of Tarlochan is not competent evidence. India offers no contrary evi-
dence. Petitioner Kulvir Singh Barapind's Corrected Reply Brief at 2-3, 9, Barapind
v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, (9th Cir. Apr. 09, 2003) (No. 02-16944) [hereinafter
Barapind's Corrected Brief].
298. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56.
299. Id. at 156. A showing by the preponderance of the evidence would be
consistent with the evidentiary standard in civil cases and hence is appropriate for an
extradition hearing. Furthermore, to determine whether an offense is political in na-
ture the defendant must also meet the preponderance threshold. Singh, 170 F. Supp.
2d at 995.
300. See Barapind, 400 F.3d at 750.
301. This is further substantiated by the Punjab Police's history of coercion in
obtaining confessions. See generally Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d 982.
213
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because of falsification of evidence by the Indian government.30 2 Five
counts fell under the political offense context and the government's
remaining affidavits had been directly challenged through recantation
affidavits. 30 3  In contrast to the method adopted by the court in
Barapind, which discounted an abundance of contradictory
evidence, 304 a Franks hearing would provide an equitable venue to
challenge the veracity of the government's evidence. With this
standard, the Barapind court could have potentially found that the
three remaining counts, weighed against the recantation evidence,
would meet the preponderance threshold.
Yet, if Barapind still did not find in favor of the defendant, there
should be one additional consideration: Can the taint from charges
initially thrown out by the court because of knowing falsification and
torture spread to the other counts?
B. How Far Should the Taint Flow?
The court in Barapind disagreed with the defendant's argument
that a finding of falsification for three of the affidavits tainted the
remaining affidavits upon which the court relied.30 5 Such a threshold
determination should have been made by looking at the totality of the
circumstances. The magistrate should have considered: (1) how many
falsified affidavits were produced; (2) the methods used in falsifying
the evidence; (3) whether any corroborating evidence shows a pattern
of repeated abuse; and finally (4) the "political" nature of the offense.
In Barapind, the government's falsification of evidence had been
established.30 6 The methods of torture, threats, and coercion used by
the Punjab police had been recognized by the court.30 7 The police had
a history of gathering evidence unlawfully and the majority of the
offenses that the court did not throw out were found to be "political"
302. Barapind's Corrected Brief, supra note 297, at 2.
303. Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 1019-39.
304. As stated previously, other courts have found recantation evidence to be
formidable enough to obliterate or negate probable cause. See supra Part IH.
305. See Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 752 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming
the district court's finding that Barapind's challenge to the affidavits did not destroy
probably cause).
306. See Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 1019 n.9.
307. Id. at 1019.
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in nature.3°8 If the court were assessing the totality of circumstances,
the fact that three of the criminal allegations were found to be falsified
and were thus tainted, plus the fact that five allegations fell under the
exception, should have called into serious question the veracity of the
three counts that led to Barapind's extradition.
In any exception case, a defendant should be able to rebut the
evidence by a preponderance of the evidence. By retaining the
strictures of the rule of non-contradiction, the exception doctrine is
virtually swallowed. A foreign government cannot claim to be a
disinterested party in exception cases; they are fully entrenched in the
outcome of the decision. Therefore, a Franks hearing, combined with
a totality of the circumstances test, provides a modicum of relief to the
defendant, giving the defendant a meaningful opportunity to challenge
the veracity of the requesting government's evidence.
VI. CONCLUSION
Only by removing the presumption of fairness given to requesting
nations, specifically in exception cases, and by providing the defense
an equitable evidentiary hearing, can the law preserve the impartiality
of an extradition hearing. With the emergence of human rights law,
domestic courts have grappled with the lack of procedural protections
afforded to the relator. One district court has acknowledged that the
United States may be imputed with human rights violations committed
against the relator by the requesting nation. 30 9 The district court
hypothesized a scenario where "an individual was involved in a civil
war of liberation against a dictatorial government and ... surrendered
from the United States." 310  The court asserted that "to enforce
extradition orders under such circumstances may implicate our courts
in grave injustices and cruel repressions." 31 ' Almost two decades
later, the United States has placed itself in just this situation.
Other nations have also stepped forward to announce that
extradition should be denied "when there is an indication of violations
308. See Barapind, 400 F.3d at 748-49.
309. Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 405 (E.D. N.Y. 1989).
310. Quigley, supra note 22, at 417.
311. Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 405.
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of human rights standards by the requesting state. 31 2 Eventually, the
United States must recognize it cannot value international comity over
fundamental human rights. The relator must be given a meaningful
opportunity to defend himself in an extradition hearing. Otherwise,
the political offense exception, which protects revolutionaries, will be
completely eroded by the politics of foreign affairs.
Hansdeep Singh *
312. Quigley, supra note 22, at 421.J.D. candidate, California Western School of Law, August 2008. This
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